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Human Factor

The Numbers Don’t Fly: Char Dham helicopter data must be opened up

Opinion: The Numbers Don't Fly, presented by Safety Matters Foundation. 21 lives lost on Char Dham helicopter routes since October 2022; 55% more pilgrims in IRCTC's 2024 count than the district's; no UCADA accounts published.

By Capt. Amit Singh FRAeS • Founder, Safety Matters Foundation

Corrected 2 November 2026: section 5 has been revised after one operator’s audited accounts showed that company-data revenue figures used in the first version were not reliable. The per-operator comparison and the ₹1,300–1,800 crore total have been withdrawn. The other findings are unchanged. The white paper has been reissued as version 1.1.

Every helicopter keeps a logbook of how long it has flown. On the Char Dham pilgrimage routes, the public figures for passengers, landings and money do not agree with each other. This is a plain-language walk through what they show, and why it matters to every pilgrim who boards.

It is just after sunrise at a helipad in the Kedarnath valley. A small helicopter lifts off with six pilgrims, flies up the valley for a few minutes, lands at the shrine, picks up six more, and comes back. Then it does it again. And again.

Every one of those flights adds minutes to the helicopter’s technical log: the record of how many hours it has flown. Inspections, engine checks and the life of key parts are all counted from that number. If the hours are right, maintenance happens on time. If they are wrong, a helicopter can fly past an inspection that is due, and nobody would know.

We looked at every public figure we could find: official passenger counts, IRCTC’s ticket sales, the rules on how busy the valley may be, an operator’s audited accounts and UCADA’s royalty. They should all tell the same story. They do not.

← The logbook is the helicopter’s health record. Everything depends on it being honest.

The short answer: the official numbers do not add up, and the records that would settle it are not published. That does not prove anything wrong is happening. It means nobody outside can check.

Watch: the explainer

The Numbers Don’t Fly (4 min 59 s). Animated illustrations, not footage of real flights. Captions on screen.

First, the human cost

In under three years, at least 21 people have died in helicopter accidents on the Char Dham routes: seven at Garud Chatti in October 2022, one struck by a tail rotor at the Kedarnath helipad in 2023, six at Gangnani and seven near Gaurikund in 2025.

Pilgrims book these flights on a government portal, at a government-capped fare, under a government-run system. Nothing at the point of sale tells them the operator’s accident record, whether DGCA has found faults, or that the official flying counts disagree.

This is not a statistic. It is 21 families.
Sketch of 21 person figures grouped by accident, with notes that most pilgrims are never told this and that no investigation has linked these accidents to unlogged flying.
Tolls as reported in the press; read with the AAIB investigation reports.

1. Two official counts, two different answers

Since 2023, every Kedarnath shuttle ticket has been sold online through IRCTC, the railways’ ticketing company. IRCTC is a listed company, so it reports its sales in its annual report. The district’s helicopter nodal officer also announces how many devotees flew.

For the 2024 season, the district said about 1.28 lakh devotees and ₹110 crore. IRCTC says 1.99 lakh pilgrims and ₹122 crore. The money is almost the same. The number of people is not: IRCTC counts about 70,000 more.

Same season. Same money. 70,000 more people?
Sketch of two crowds: 1.28 lakh devotees in the district count and 1.99 lakh pilgrims in IRCTC's count, with the extra 70,000 marked in red.
Each figure is about 5,000 people. IRCTC Annual Reports (2023-24, p. 66; 2024-25); Rudraprayag District Tourism Officer.

In plain words. One of these counts is measuring something different. It could be bookings rather than people, one-way trips rather than return trips, or tickets later cancelled. Neither source says which. That alone should be fixed: the public should know how many people actually flew.

2. How busy can the valley safely be?

Until September 2025, DGCA’s operations circular capped Kedarnath shuttles by base: no more than 2 an hour from Guptkashi, 3 from Phata and 4 from Sirsi. That is 9 an hour, or about 108 landings a day over a 12-hour flying day. On top of that, no more than four helicopters may be in the upper valley at once, and only one may land or take off at Kedarnath at a time. A shuttle carries at most six passengers.

Now do the sum. IRCTC’s 1,98,916 pilgrims for 2024, at six per landing, needed about 33,150 landings. At 108 a day, that would take about 307 days: far longer than the season. Put another way, the limits allowed about 77,800 pilgrims in a 120-day season; IRCTC reports about 2.6 times as many.

2 + 3 + 4 = 9 an hour × 12 hours = 108 a day. IRCTC’s count needs 221 to 276 a day.
Sketch: the hourly limits in force from 2023 to 2025 allowed 108 Kedarnath landings a day; IRCTC's 2024 count needs about 221 to 276 a day, which at 108 a day would take 307 days.
Hourly limits from DGCA OC 02/2023 as presented in an official safety review (mid-2025); they applied until Rev 1 in September 2025. SMF calculation, assuming full helicopters. Full working in SMF White Paper 03, Annex B.

Did you know? In 2024, UCADA’s then chief executive said demand was about ten times the seats available. Operators were fined for black-marketing tickets, and 65 fake booking websites were shut down. Tickets sold outside the official system appear in no official count at all.

3. Can trips be squeezed in by cutting corners?

One way to fit more trips into a day is to fly shorter paths: across the ridges instead of along the valley. The circular does not allow this. It sets one route for everyone: climb to 8,500 ft by the valley entry, turn at Sonprayag, 9,000 ft by Gaurikund, 10,000 ft by Bhimbali, keep to the right, and make a radio call at every reporting point.

It even sets a minimum flight time for every shuttle: 18 minutes from Guptkashi, 16 from Phata, 14 from Sersi. A regulator does not set a floor on flight time unless short flights are a worry.

The valley is the road. The ridges are a shortcut through the clouds.
Schematic sketch of the prescribed valley route and a dashed shortcut over the ridges through cloud.
Schematic, not to scale. Route and times from DGCA Operations Circular 02/2023 Rev 1 (September 2025).

Why it matters. Over a ridge, cloud can close in within minutes and there is nowhere to land. A helicopter off the valley route is also where no other pilot expects it to be. SMF has no evidence that this happens. Every helicopter carries a tracking device, and UCADA says it tracks every trip in real time. The flight paths would settle it in an afternoon. They are not published, and on-board recordings are kept for only 14 days.

4. Money that does not fit the tickets

Divide the money by the passengers and each pilgrim should come out at about one fare. The 2025 round-trip fares are ₹8,532 from Guptkashi, ₹6,062 from Phata and ₹6,060 from Sirsi. IRCTC’s figures fit: ₹122 crore ÷ 1,98,916 = about ₹6,100 each, which also suggests its count is of real passengers. The officials’ figures do not: about ₹10,600 per devotee for May 2025 and ₹15,400 for the first 18 days of June, more than the dearest ticket.
IRCTC’s money fits its passengers. The officials’ does not.
Sketch of a receipt: 25 crore rupees divided by 16,250 devotees is 15,400 rupees each, 1.8 times the dearest round-trip fare of 8,532 rupees.
Rudraprayag District Tourism Officer (ETV Bharat, 1 and 19 June 2025); 2025 fares from an official safety review; SMF calculation.

5. The operators’ books: a correction

Correction (2 November 2026). An earlier version of this section compared four shuttle operators’ revenues, taken from company-data websites, with what Kedarnath shuttles could earn, and put the private operators’ combined revenue at about ₹1,300–1,800 crore. SMF has withdrawn both. One operator’s audited accounts showed the website figure was not reliable, and we cannot assume the others are.

Company-data websites had put one shuttle operator’s annual revenue at about ₹219 crore. Its financial statements, filed with the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, show ₹129 crore in total in 2024-25, of which only about ₹31 crore came from helicopters, across every base and every state, shuttle and charter together. The rest came from a business unrelated to aviation.

SMF’s ceiling for Kedarnath shuttles is unchanged: about ₹3.9–7.4 crore a season for each operator’s share of its base’s slots, and about ₹51 crore for all nine together, at 2025 fares.

Websites that track companies are not audited accounts. We checked, and we were wrong to rely on them.
Sketch comparing one operator's revenue: about 219 crore rupees on a company-data website, crossed out, against 129 crore rupees in its audited accounts, of which about 31 crore came from helicopters.

In plain words. On its audited figures, this operator’s flying income fits what its helicopters can earn. Whether each operator’s Char Dham income matches its landings, passengers and royalty can only be checked from audited accounts and official records. That is a job for the financial audit SMF has asked for. The gaps that remain are between the official counts themselves.

6. The one ledger that would settle it

There is a simple, independent count of Kedarnath landings, and the state already holds it. Under its shuttle contracts, UCADA charges operators ₹5,000 for every landing at Kedarnath, paid weekly, plus a 3% fee on tickets. Divide the royalty by ₹5,000 and you have the exact number of landings.

On the official passenger counts, that should come to about ₹14–20 crore a year. The only figure that has reached the press is “₹49 lakh”, for 2023, in a report that also called it ₹21 crore more than the year before. UCADA’s accounts are not published. The “Budget” page of its website reads “No record found”.

One spreadsheet would answer most of this article.
Sketch of a ledger with 5,000 rupees per landing, a No record found stamp, expected 14 to 20 crore rupees a year and 49 lakh reported in the press.
Royalty and fee from UCADA’s shuttle tender; expected receipts are SMF estimates; press figure from Amar Ujala.

7. The regulator was on the ground

None of this happened out of sight. After the June 2025 crash, the Ministry of Civil Aviation directed DGCA to post airworthiness, safety and operations officers in the Kedarnath valley. When services resumed, DGCA said its teams would monitor critical helipads with surprise checks, and air traffic controllers from the Airports Authority of India would man the control rooms. For 2026, air traffic control and weather units were set up at Sahastradhara and Sersi.

An air traffic control unit keeps a movement log. An airworthiness officer can open a technical log on the spot. Between them, the officials in the valley hold exactly the records that would reconcile landings, passengers and flying hours.

The records exist. The officers were there. Only the comparison is missing.
Sketch of four cards, air traffic control, DGCA officers, IRCTC and UCADA, with arrows to a bubble: compare landings, passengers, money and hours. Has anyone? Not published.

Three facts that say it plainly

No estimate is needed for these. They come from official sources.

21 lives in under three years.

At least 21 people have died in helicopter accidents on the Char Dham routes since October 2022. Most pilgrims who buy a seat are never told.

Two official counts, 70,000 people apart.

For the same 2024 season, IRCTC’s annual report counts about 1.99 lakh pilgrims; the district counted about 1.28 lakh.

No accounts.

The one ledger that would count every Kedarnath landing, UCADA’s royalty, is not published.

A pilgrim is asked for an ID card before boarding. The helicopter’s logbook is never shown to anyone outside.

What SMF suspects, and what it does not

SMF has not seen any technical log or movement log. The figures above point to four possibilities that the authorities can confirm or rule out:

  1. More flying than officially counted. Settled by: ATC movement logs, UCADA royalty receipts.
  2. Shortcuts over the ridges. Settled by: tracking-device flight paths, on-board recordings.
  3. Flying hours left out of technical logs. Inspections and part changes would fall due late, and pilots’ flight-time limits could be breached. Settled by: logs checked against tracking data.
  4. Money outside the official channel. Settled by: operators’ audited segment accounts, IRCTC manifests.

Each has innocent explanations. But these gaps arose under official supervision, so they should be examined by an authority above those officials.

A question is not an accusation. But a question nobody can check is a risk.

What this means if you fly

  • This does not say the helicopters are unsafe. Pilots, engineers and the regulator all add layers of protection, and most flights are routine.
  • It says the public cannot check whether the paperwork matches the flying, and that the official numbers that are public do not agree.
  • Weather in the valley changes fast. If a flight is held for cloud, that is the system working. Do not pressure crews to go.
  • The fix is not in passengers’ hands. It is in published data, independent checks and records kept long enough to be checked.

What should change

  1. An independent inquiry, ordered by the Ministry of Civil Aviation, separate from the DGCA and UCADA teams in the valley, to reconcile IRCTC bookings, ATC movement logs, UCADA royalty receipts and technical logs, and publish the result. The CAG should audit UCADA’s heli-service receipts.
  2. Publish the counts and the money: UCADA’s receipts, trips and passengers, per season and per operator, with clear definitions of “departure” and “pilgrim”.
  3. Keep the evidence for the whole season, not 14 days.
  4. Tell the passengers. The booking page should show each operator’s accident record and any current DGCA finding.
  5. Make the accounts visible. Shuttle operators should report their Char Dham revenue separately, as a condition of the tender.
Inquiry → publish → keep the evidence → tell the passengers.

How this was done, and how sure we are

Every figure comes from a public source: IRCTC’s audited annual reports, statements by the Ministry of Civil Aviation, DGCA and Rudraprayag officials, DGCA’s operations circular, UCADA’s tender documents and website, AAIB reports and press reports. We are most confident in the IRCTC and circular figures, which come from formal documents. The hourly shuttle limits and 2025 fares come from an official safety review presented in mid-2025. The landings needed, capacity under those limits, operator maxima and UCADA’s expected receipts are SMF calculations built on stated, generous assumptions; the full working is in SMF White Paper 03, Annex B. Operator revenue is cited only from audited accounts filed with the Ministry of Corporate Affairs; company-data figures used in the first version have been withdrawn (see section 5). Wherever a figure could be read more than one way, we have said so.

Read the white paper.Download SMF White Paper 03, Counting What Flies (PDF, 17 pages), with every figure, its source and the full working.

Sources and Methodology

This document draws upon information, reports, records and data available in the public domain from official and other identified sources. The material has been examined and reviewed by Safety Matters Foundation (SMF).

Sources are cited wherever applicable. Findings, interpretations and recommendations attributable to SMF are distinguished from statements contained in the original sources.

Main sources:

  • IRCTC Annual Report 2023-24 (p. 66) and Annual Report 2024-25, Board’s Report
  • Rudraprayag District Tourism Officer statements (2024, 2025)
  • Ministry of Civil Aviation release, 27 June 2026
  • DGCA Operations Circular 02/2023 Rev 1, including its prescribed Kedarnath route and minimum flight times
  • UCADA tender documents and website
  • An official safety review (mid-2025), including DGCA OC 02/2023 hourly shuttle limits, 2025 fares and the charter operator list
  • Ministry of Civil Aviation and DGCA statements on deployments, as reported by ETV Bharat and The Tribune
  • AAIB India reports; press reports of accidents; Amar Ujala
  • Audited financial statements filed with the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (one operator, anonymised)

Capt. Amit Singh FRAeS is a senior commercial pilot and founder of Safety Matters Foundation, an independent, not-for-profit aviation safety organisation in India. No one commissioned this review and it received no external funding. Operators are anonymised. Sketches are illustrations; estimates are SMF’s, not official findings. This article does not allege that any operator has under-logged flying hours, and does not accuse any operator, pilot or official. Spotted a mistake? Write to admin@safetymatters.co.in; confirmed corrections will be acknowledged and published.


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