AAIB Preliminary Report On VT-SSK Remains Data-Light Despite Strong Visibility Narrative

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Ref: SMF/PR/2026/02/015/v1

Subhead: Safety Matters Foundation urges an interim FDR factual appendix and clear sourcing for flight-track graphics, maintenance baselines, and visibility assessment methods.

Gurugram, India — 28, Feb, 2026 — Safety Matters Foundation today issued a statement on the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) Preliminary Report into the accident involving VT-SSK (Learjet 45XR), noting that the report advances an early narrative that visibility at Baramati was below VFR minima and that the aerodrome’s limited infrastructure is a significant hazard—while also reiterating the standard principle that preliminary reports are not final and may change as evidence is analysed.

At the same time, Safety Matters Foundation said the report remains data-light against reasonable public expectations for evidence-backed transparency—especially given it confirms that flight data recorder (FDR) data was successfully downloaded—and contains a flight-track plot presented without a stated data source, despite apparent inconsistencies when compared with the reported wreckage location and aircraft attitude at impact.

“The public does not need conclusions at the preliminary stage—but it does need sourced facts,” said Capt. Amit Singh, Founder, Safety Matters Foundation. “If a flight-track plot is included, the report should clearly state whether it comes from FDR, GPS, ADS-B, radar, or another system, and how it was time-aligned and quality-checked against physical evidence such as wreckage location and impact attitude.”

What The Preliminary Report Says

The AAIB preliminary report states that:

• Baramati was operating as a VFR-only aerodrome with limited facilities and no certified meteorological service, with visibility assessed using local marker references.
• The flight conducted an initial approach, executed a go-around, and during the second approach the aircraft impacted terrain left of the runway and was consumed by post-impact fire.
• Both recorders were recovered from the tail; the FDR raw data was successfully downloaded, while the CVR is thermally damaged and requires manufacturer/state support for recovery.

Where The Report Falls Short Of Public Expectations

Safety Matters Foundation highlighted gaps that, if addressed in a non-conclusive interim update, would materially improve public understanding without prejudging final findings:

1. A visibility narrative is advanced without publishing supporting flight data.
   Despite confirming successful FDR download, the preliminary report does not provide even a basic set of FDR-derived factual parameters (speed, altitude, vertical speed, pitch/roll, configuration changes, thrust setting, go-around timing). Without these, the public cannot independently assess whether the sequence aligns with a stabilized/unstabilized approach, an early/late go-around, loss of visual references, spatial disorientation risk during manoeuvring in haze/fog, or other technical contributors.
2. Flight-track plot is presented without a stated data source and appears misaligned with reported physical evidence.
   The report includes a plotted flight track but does not identify the underlying data source (e.g., FDR, GPS, ADS-B, radar, or reconstructed estimate), nor does it explain time synchronization or accuracy limits. As presented, the plotted track appears to show the aircraft to the right of the runway, whereas the report’s own narrative indicates the aircraft impacted terrain left of the runway, and that the aircraft was in a right bank at impact. Absent sourcing and reconciliation, readers cannot assess whether this reflects normal plot uncertainty, a coordinate/reference error, a time-offset issue, or a reconstruction that is provisional.
3. CVR—critical for crew decision-making—remains unavailable.
   The report acknowledges the cockpit voice recorder is not yet downloaded, leaving a major gap on the most consequential “why” questions: decision gates, callouts, workload, and what prompted continuation of the approach in marginal conditions.
4. Visibility measurement reliability isn’t validated.
   The report relies on tower-reported visibility derived from local marker methods, yet does not explain who was trained to estimate visibility, uncertainty margins, validation method, or why the visibility figure should be trusted as equivalent to formal MET/RVR—despite the narrative and recommendations hinging heavily on visibility.
5. Fire and recorder survivability are not reconciled.
   Recorders were recovered in the tail in original location, yet both units were thermally damaged due to fire. The report does not explain fire dynamics (duration, proximity to fuel-fed fire, response timeline) that would reconcile “tail structure recovery” with “significant recorder thermal damage.”
6. Engine cycle discrepancy and Check D interpretation require explicit clarification (presumed, unverified).
   The preliminary report references maintenance/engine information in a way that appears to include an engine cycle discrepancy, but does not clearly define the baseline, method, or reconciliation process used to establish cycle counts. In addition, it is presumed (unverified) that Check D was assessed as compliant primarily using hour-based data rather than calendar-time data, which can materially change how “due” status is interpreted depending on the approved maintenance programme. Until the AAIB publishes the relevant definitions, sources, and reconciliation steps, these points should be treated as presumed and unverified and not as established causal contributors.

What The Public Should Expect Next

Safety Matters Foundation called for a stronger interim update—still explicitly non-conclusive—that includes:

Bullet points (recommended interim transparency measures):

• A short FDR factual appendix (plots or key values around approach/go-around/impact)
• A clear statement on time synchronization (e.g., CCTV vs FDR time base)
• Explicit sourcing for the flight-track plot (FDR/GPS/ADS-B/radar/reconstruction), plus stated accuracy limits and reconciliation against wreckage/impact evidence
• Status and recoverability pathway for CVR audio, including manufacturer/state support steps
• A clearer description of fire progression and response to contextualize recorder thermal damage
• A plain-language maintenance data note clarifying definitions and reconciliation for cycles vs hours, and how Check D compliance is determined under the applicable approved programme (hours vs calendar-time), including what is confirmed versus pending verification

Bottom Line

The preliminary report appropriately highlights systemic risks at a VFR-only aerodrome and points to visibility limitations as a likely central hazard. However, it advances that narrative without publishing objective corroboration it confirms it already possesses—downloaded FDR data—and without the complementary human-factors record from the CVR. Additionally, the inclusion of an unsourced flight-track plot that appears inconsistent with the reported wreckage location and impact attitude underscores the need for basic sourcing, time-alignment notes, and factual appendices to maintain public confidence while the investigation remains ongoing.

For further information and updates on Safety Matters Foundation’s aviation safety advocacy, visit www.safetymatters.co.in.

ABOUT SAFETY MATTERS FOUNDATION
Safety Matters Foundation is an India-based safety advocacy organisation focused on strengthening operational safety culture through education, evidence-based recommendations, and public-interest engagement on accident prevention and risk reduction. Founded by Capt. Amit Singh, the Foundation works to promote practical, measurable safety improvements across aviation and allied domains.
URL: www.safetymatters.co.in

MEDIA CONTACT:
Name, Title: Capt. Amit Singh
Phone: ++919899399776
Email: admin@safetymatters.co.in
Website: www.safetymatters.co.in
X: @flyingamit, @safetymatters6

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