How EASA Rejected Single Pilot Operations: The End of a Risky Experiment

In the ever-evolving world of aviation, automation and technological advancements often bring bold proposals aimed at cost efficiency and operational innovation. One such idea, Single Pilot Operations (SiPO) during commercial flights, gained considerable traction in recent years. Advocates of the concept argued that with improved cockpit technology and ground-based support, airlines could operate with only one pilot in certain phases of flight—or even throughout.

However, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)—widely respected for its scientific and safety-focused approach—recently concluded an extensive study and rejected the proposal for Extended Minimum Crew Operations (eMCO) and Single Pilot Operations in commercial airline service, citing serious concerns over safety, human factors, and system reliability.

This post delves into the details of the proposal, the findings of EASA, and what this decision means for the future of commercial aviation.

The Rise of the Single Pilot Concept

The concept of reducing cockpit crew from two to one is not new. Proponents argue that with advancements in avionics, artificial intelligence, and remote ground control support, many cockpit tasks can be automated or handled externally. Airlines, under increasing pressure to reduce costs, saw potential in SiPO to save on pilot salaries, training, and rostering complexities.

The COVID-19 pandemic only amplified this push. With global airlines bleeding billions and pilot shortages looming due to mass retirements, the industry began exploring radical efficiency measures. Airbus, for example, collaborated with several partners to explore SiPO under the NextGen eMCO project, funded partly by the European Commission.

Understanding eMCO and SiPO

EASA’s research primarily addressed Extended Minimum Crew Operations (eMCO)—an intermediate step toward full single-pilot flights. Under eMCO, long-haul flights would begin with two pilots, but during cruise, one pilot would leave the cockpit for rest, and the other would operate solo, assisted by enhanced cockpit systems and remote ground support.

Ultimately, eMCO was considered a stepping stone to the even more ambitious Single Pilot Operations throughout the flight, including takeoff and landing. This would theoretically require an extremely high level of cockpit automation, advanced contingency systems, and redefined air traffic management support.

EASA’s Rigorous Risk Assessment

Between 2021 and 2024, EASA conducted an exhaustive risk and feasibility study as part of the eMCO-SiPO project. The findings were published in 2024, and the conclusion was stark:

“With the current cockpit design taken as a reference, and within the limits of the research, it was identified that an equivalent level of safety between eMCO and the current two-crew operations cannot be sufficiently demonstrated.”
— EASA Final Report on eMCO-SiPO

The agency analyzed technical systems, pilot behavior, emergency procedures, and human factors—especially cognitive load, fatigue, situational awareness, and failure response capabilities of a lone pilot. The outcome made one thing clear: humans cannot be fully replaced in the cockpit, and two are better than one when things go wrong.

Key Risks Identified by EASA

1. Loss of Redundancy: With a single pilot, the system lacks the inherent cross-checking and support structure that two pilots provide. This affects everything from checklist execution to detecting errors.
2. Emergency Situations: In the event of pilot incapacitation, fire, sudden decompression, or flight control issues, a second pilot is essential for safe recovery. Ground support, no matter how advanced, cannot replace hands-on in-flight decision-making.
3. Cognitive Overload: A solo pilot in cruise phase, particularly after long hours, can experience reduced alertness. EASA cited the risk of cognitive lockup—when a person under stress is unable to switch tasks or think creatively, a well-documented phenomenon in aviation human factors research.
4. Security Concerns: Situations like cockpit intrusion, hijack attempts, or unruly passengers demand immediate action and coordination between two cockpit crew. A lone pilot locked in the cockpit is a vulnerability.
5. System Reliability: Even with advanced automation, software failures, sensor errors, or cyberattacks cannot be fully ruled out. In such cases, human redundancy becomes a vital safety net.
6. Passenger Confidence: Public perception matters. Surveys showed a significant drop in passenger confidence when told their flight might have only one pilot onboard.

Industry Reaction

The EASA findings came as a blow to manufacturers and some airline executives, particularly Airbus, which had invested in the future of eMCO. However, many pilot unions, safety experts, and regulators welcomed the rejection.

The European Cockpit Association (ECA) issued a strong statement:

“This is a victory for flight safety. Reducing the number of pilots in the cockpit while increasing their responsibilities is not innovation—it’s a cost-cutting gamble. We commend EASA for standing by science.”

ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization), while not taking a formal stance, has advised extreme caution in any moves toward single pilot commercial operations.

Lessons from Accidents

The rejection is also grounded in the harsh lessons of past incidents. Accidents such as Air France 447, where pilot coordination broke down under pressure, or Ethiopian 302, where crew failed to manage runaway automation, underscore the need for two skilled humans in the cockpit. Even the controversial Germanwings 9525 crash (where a lone pilot locked his captain out) became a grim reminder of why dual presence is a safety standard.

The Future: Assist, Not Replace

While single-pilot airline flights are off the table, this doesn’t mean cockpit innovation stops. EASA and others continue to explore cockpit augmentation tools—systems that support the human, not replace them. Examples include:

• AI-assisted checklists
• Enhanced real-time decision support
• Advanced fatigue monitoring
• Improved automation transparency

Future aircraft may have smarter systems, but they will still require two trained humans who understand how to work as a team. The concept of crew resource management (CRM)—the coordination, communication, and shared situational awareness between two pilots—remains irreplaceable.

Final Thoughts

The aviation industry is built on the foundations of redundancy, risk mitigation, and human judgment. EASA’s decision to reject single-pilot operations reaffirms that efficiency must never override safety. In a high-stakes environment like aviation, the margin for error is slim, and the cost of failure is measured in lives.

This decision is a signal to the world: technology can enhance safety, but it cannot substitute for human presence in the cockpit. Passengers may not notice the second pilot on every flight—but thanks to EASA’s stand, they can rest assured that someone is always there.

📚 Read More

• EASA Final Report on eMCO/SIPO
• ECA Statement on Single Pilot Risk
• Safety Studies on Human Factors in Aviation